THE FAILURE OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE TO EXPLAIN DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: PUZZLES OF MODERNIZATION OR WESTERNIZATION

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Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of demography is its intellectual isolation. This arises not only from the defensive stance that most social sciences adopt on their borders or from demographers' lack of expertise in contiguous disciplines, but the fact that these other disciplines concerned with social change often appear to have little to offer. Demographers come to works on social and economic change expecting to find explanations for the onset of fertility transition or of such steepness in mortality decline that cannot be explained by technological or environmental innovation, only to discover that these issues are all but ignored.

One reaction - and one which has come close to dominating modern demography - is to decide that the great demographic changes were phenomena that occurred largely within a demographic context and can be explained by indices that demographers are most competent to measure. This solution is a peculiarly satisfactory one from the viewpoint of the profession, maximizing the use of existing skills. It has permitted the World Fertility Survey to develop a Core Questionnaire which seeks masses of demographic data and little other information\(^1\) so that inevitably demographic phenomena will be largely explained in terms of other demographic change (and probably correctly, within the limited range allowed for the explanation). It has encouraged demographers to seek explanations of fertility change in terms of shifting attitudes - of ideal family size, reproductive norms, and so on - even when there was little satisfactory evidence that movement in ideals and norms preceded behavioral changes, let alone that the origins of such change lay in them.

An alternative reaction - probably the dominant view in the other social sciences - is that demography has little that needs explanation; indeed that there is really no such discipline but merely an area of behavior where the measurement of change should be encouraged by persons with adequate statistical techniques. Mortality decline was always desired and occurred when the means were available, while replacement and survival, rather than high fertility, had always been the reproductive aim. I believe that the mortality transition can be shown to have had social as well as technological roots,\(^2\) but will concentrate here on the issue that is potentially much more challenging to the adequacy of socioeconomic change theory, that of the onset of fertility transition.

It can be argued that nothing much happened, that the death rate fell and so did the birth rate, leaving the surviving family at much the same size.\(^3\) The truth is probably rather that something very significant happened when sustained fertility decline occurred, perhaps the most fundamental social change
in history, and that the instinct of most demographers is right in feeling that they are the custodians of a great truth and that explanations of social change which cannot account for fertility decline are inadequate.

Certainly, any comparison of the experience of the post-fertility-decline population with that during the decades or generations immediately preceding the transition, demonstrates a marked contrast. Australian women who married a generation before the beginning of fertility decline averaged seven births, reared six young children, brought five to adulthood, and were accompanied into old age by four or five. The American experience was undoubtedly similar. In England of the late eighteenth century, a hundred years before the transition, women who married bore on average six children, raised four to five through childhood, and brought four to adulthood and three to their old age. This concentration on the erosion of the family helps to give a less than whole picture of the change. One reason is that reproduction was not merely for support in old age; even in economic terms young children provided help. Another reason is that socially it is far off the mark. The pre-transitional family was dominated by reproduction as contemporary descriptions and novels well attest. Even a woman who would enter old age with only three or four surviving children, would have experienced around seven pregnancies and births, and would have at least begun rearing six or seven children with their infancies and childhoods, and possibly deaths, overlapping through twenty to twenty-five years or probably the great majority of the married life that she and her husband would spend together. Nor was this a temporary phenomenon. In European settlement areas overseas birth rates remained far above death rates for centuries; this is the experience from which Malthus drew his lesson, and he drew it at the close of the eighteenth rather than the nineteenth century. There was, until the late nineteenth century, no move to change this position even in those societies which were sufficiently removed from their more traditional roots to have been described as "born modern". In Australia the daughters of those who married in the 1870s bearing seven children and rearing five or six to adulthood, bore five around the turn of the century and reared four to adulthood, while the grand-daughters in the 1930s bore three and usually reared three.

The nature of the family and the household had changed dramatically. In the most traditional parts of the contemporary world - in, for instance, the rural areas of Sahelian Africa where the annual rate of natural increase may still be only one per cent in spite of early marriage and virtually unrestricted fertility - the family is characterized more than in any other way by children, by their births, their growing-up and their deaths. This is not so in post-transitional societies. Something epoch-making happened for good and sufficient reasons, and any explanation of change which ignores or
fails to explain the fertility transition is almost certainly wrong.

This paper has two interrelated aims. The first is to evaluate the most influential contemporary theories of change by the criterion just proffered and to search for an explanation and solution. The second is to ascertain whether they are broad enough to explain the diffusion of demographic change as part of a more general process of social diffusion. It will be maintained that the formation of a global society is at least as much a reality as the formation of a global economy and that this is far from being a simple process of the latter dictating the former; indeed it will be argued that a global demography is being established.

The more detailed attention will be paid to those who have put forward in recent times comprehensive theories of change which appear to have had a substantial impact on the way contemporary global change is interpreted. On the social, psychological and attitudinal side, this includes Daniel Lerner, Alex Inkeles and Everett Hagen. From the more economic viewpoint it includes Arthur Lewis, Walt Rostow and Gunnar Myrdal, and Theodore Schultz representing the Chicago household economists. In addition some attention will be paid to a score of others, some profound but without equal public or cross-disciplinary impact.

This is not an exercise of marginal significance to demographic theory. On the contrary, the enquiry should be central. There cannot be two adequate and different explanations of the broad sweep of social change. If the major theories of social and economic change do not easily explain both the fact and timing of fertility decline, then the theories themselves are probably not merely deficient but wrong. Similarly, little trust can be put in a narrow explanation of demographic change that cannot be expanded to explain the other major social transformations that occurred around the same time.

There is a real need to concentrate on several of the main change theorists. Collectively, their way of looking at the problem has had a major impact on demographers trained in either sociology or economics. Without this backing, there probably would have been a much greater reluctance to accept the concept of changing ideal family size as of fundamental importance, indeed as being anything but a symptom.

One of the basic weaknesses of contemporary social science is its desire to seek only positive results, and its feeling that it is time-wasting to point to the significance of what is absent rather than what is present. The following analysis will, on the contrary, devote much of its attention to the absence of adequate explanations of fertility decline, on the grounds that this omission is not merely fortuitous but is evidence of fundamental error in the explanation of social and economic change as well and to the need for recognizing that a separate theory of demographic change is a meaningless and dangerous concept.
The explanations offered for fertility decline

Lerner, in spite of all his emphasis on "psychic mobility", not only offers no explanation for fertility decline, but fails to mention its occurrence. Nowhere in The Passing of Traditional Society is high fertility referred to as a characteristic of traditional society. One explanation is, of course, that he was analyzing the Middle East during the 1950s, at a time when moderate family size was a characteristic of only elite groups probably confined largely to urban areas of Lebanon and Western Turkey. Nevertheless, the failure to discuss the possibility of declining fertility, and the circumstances that might give rise to it, is surprising in view of the discussion by demographers during the 1950s of hypothesised relationships between fertility and development.


Inkeles, in a series of publications spanning over a decade from 1966 and written either on his own or together with Smith or Miller, nowhere really discusses why modernization might penalize the highly fertile in a way that traditional society would not. The closest Inkeles and Smith came to it was in a single passage published in 1966: "we assumed that modernity would emerge as a complex but coherent set of psychic dispositions manifested in general qualities such as a sense of efficacy, readiness for new experience, and interest in planning, linked, in turn, to certain dispositions to act in institutional relations (their italics) - as in being an active citizen, valuing science, maintaining one's autonomy in kinship matters, and accepting birth control (my italics) ... we assumed these personal qualities would be the end product of certainly early and late socialization experiences such as education, urban experience, and work in modern organizations such as the factory". On reporting on the completed research project in six developing countries, in Becoming Modern, the only references in the index to fertility decline were under the heading, "Birth control, attitudes toward". There were twelve references of this kind but most were still in the form of planning hypotheses or justifications for questions asked or scales employed. The most specific was: "Although birth control depends in great measure on scientific technology and on particular practices guided by that technology, even the most spectacular advances in science, such as new contraceptive pills, cannot have the desired effect except as they may be supported by the motive to use them and by patterns of interpersonal relations that make that motivation effective. To assess attitudes in this area, therefore, we inquired into our respondents' ideas of the ideal number of children and into their readiness to limit that number under various conditions". The only argument that was not attitudinal was the intriguing reference to "patterns
of interpersonal relations", but what was meant is apparently fully covered a few pages later in the statement, "Men more independent of the extended family might well also be more interested in practicing birth control." The findings appear briefly in several references to "modern characteristics, such as favoring birth control", and a longer statement about the educated: "They valued science more, accepted change more rapidly, and were more prepared to limit the number of children they would have. In short, by virtue of having had more formal schooling, their personal character was decidedly more modern". It is a case of viewpoint (even toward family size) rather than behavior, and of opinions rather than of material circumstances.

The economists do not lean much further towards economic determinism. Lewis, in his 1955 study, The Theory of Economic Growth, backed three different possibilities without appearing to regard them as in any way alternatives, but rather being additive in nature. The first was admittedly economic but of unknown nature: "We do not know what caused this decline [in fertility]. We assume, and argue, that it followed inevitably from the process of economic growth, and that it will therefore be repeated in all countries as they undergo the same processes, but we have no certainty that things will turn out this way". The second was demographic determinism in the form of mortality decline: "It is pretty safe to assume that the fall in the birth rate is due to a change of attitude towards childbearing and not merely to new techniques of birth control ... What brought this change of attitude? Probably the most important reason is simply the fall in the death rate". The third was the removal of the Notesteinian props when this became prudent: "Sooner or later the disadvantages of a rapidly growing population become obvious to the leaders of the community, and the religious precepts urging maximum childbearing are dropped". The implied argument seems to be that high fertility was never economically advantageous for those individuals or societies accidentally achieving fertility beyond that needed for survival, but that high fertility had to be encouraged to ensure that all societies and nearly all families physically survived. Because fertility beyond replacement (or perhaps even fertility at or below this level) was not economically advantageous to the family (and was probably disadvantageous) religious exhortation was needed to prevent fertility control being practiced. When mortality declined, and the danger of not surviving (at least at the societal level) had passed, priority could be given to the economic disadvantages of high fertility, which had been there all along and had plagued those sections of the community with below average child mortality, and the religious sanctions on fertility control were relaxed with the result that fertility control was practiced and the birth rate declined.
Rostow published a paper on "The Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth" in 195621 which was expanded into The Stages of Economic Growth in 1960.22 There was only one reference to the cause of the fertility decline: "The view towards the having of children - initially the residual blessing and affirmation of immortality in a hard life, of relatively fixed horizons - must change in ways which ultimately yield a decline in the birth-rate, as the possibility of progress and the decline in the need for unskilled farm labour create a new calculus".23 The argument is that large numbers of children (or at least large numbers of children with no skills or little education) are a disadvantage to the family once the economy attains sustained economic growth. Presumably they are earlier less of a disadvantage, although the possibility that they might have been no economic disadvantage (or even a positive advantage) seems to be nullified by referring exclusively to the problems of survival and company in traditional society. He makes no attempt to explain the curious fact that Britain, the United States and Germany experienced take-offs considerably before the onset of fertility decline, Britain a quarter of a century earlier.

Myrdal, in 1957 in his Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions,24 made repeated references to fertility decline and birth control, but always as something that had happened, and hence had economic and social consequences, in the West, and was needed elsewhere. However, in the three-volume Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, published in 1968, there are four references to fertility decline giving a hint of an explanation for its occurrence. "The prospects for a spontaneous spread of contraceptive practices [in South Asia] cannot be discussed by analogy to Western experience. The progressive reduction of fertility in the West, particularly since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was indeed the consequence of widespread spontaneous adoption of birth control practices. But it occurred in an economic, social and cultural context so different from South Asia's that any comparison is pointless. Even without considering birth control as a simple function of levels of income and living, it must be recalled that its spread on a significant scale in the West began only when those levels were much higher than they can be expected to be in the near future in South Asian countries, under even the most optimistic assumptions ... As for industrialization and urbanization, literacy, education level, and a rationalist culture in general, the differences are equally great".25 "It is more relevant to study such fertility differentials as may exist within individual South Asian countries, between groups differing in, say, income and education ... as to
the possibilities for a spontaneous spread of birth control through a rise in income, education, and the like for the masses of the people". Next, we are told of the possible consequences "if fertility tended to decline in response to economic growth ..." Finally, the conclusion is drawn that, "as yet only a very few people in South Asia are awake to the advantage of birth control for the individual family". The references to "a rationalist culture" and "being awake to the advantages of birth control" certainly imply that high fertility, or at least an above average number of surviving children, is economically disadvantageous even in traditional, subsistence, agrarian societies. The engine for change is economic growth and it works through education, literacy and urbanization, which produce enlightened or rational people capable of calculating where their future advantage lies.

In the introduction to a volume devoted to the new household economists, Theodore Schultz explained that "in thinking about the economics of fertility, social cost and benefits aside, the analytical key in determining the value of children to their parents is in the interactions between the supply and demand factors that influence these family decisions". "A very young child is highly labor-intensive in terms of cost, and the rewards are wholly psychic in terms of utility. As a child becomes a teen-ager, the additional cost borne by the parents involves less labor intensiveness and the rewards, especially in poor countries, consist in increasing part of useful work that the teen-ager performs ... in reality each consumer service has two prices attached to it: (1) a money price, as in traditional theory of consumer choice, and (2) a time cost of acquiring the consumer goods and processing them in the household; and the time cost that is involved in consuming the services obtained from this household activity. It is obvious that bearing a child and caring for the infant child are normally highly labor-intensive activities on the part of the mother. What has not been clear is the difference in the value of time of mothers in bearing and rearing children associated with the difference in the human capital of mothers. The studies [that follow] contribute substantially in clarifying this relationship". However, most do not contribute to understanding either the economics of pre-transitional societies or the changes leading to the onset of fertility decline because the emphasis is on the contemporary United States. There is certainly the implication here that there are societies where high fertility could be economically rewarding, although the following statement casts some doubt on whether Schultz himself would agree: "the decline in child mortality underway in most poor countries is in all probability an important variable
to which parents are responding with lags as they become informed and are prepared to act, given the state of information that is relevant to their fertility decisions".31 There is certainly a tool here for constructing and testing a theory of the destabilization of the stable high fertility situation, given that the problems of dealing with parental time consumption in work and child-care situations very different from the United States could be overcome. So far this has not been done, and members of the group have been largely content to work on aggregate economic and social indices which establish that massive - and, presumably, eventually decisive - change is occurring,32 or on theoretical constructs for such analysis,33 without demonstrating the sequence of household changes that leads to high fertility becoming economically disadvantageous or that determines the timing of that event, two essential requirements for a satisfactory theory of the initiation of fertility transition.34

Elsewhere35 there is practically nothing in the way of explanation. In the work within the social mobilization tradition, extending from Karl Mannheim36 through Karl Deutsch,37 there appears to be only a solitary comment from C.E. Black: "In the advanced countries, as a result both of external pressures and of changes in family practices, the birth rate has been significantly reduced".38 The emphasis, as in the whole tradition, is on migration weakening kinships bonds, without much explanation of the mechanics, except distance, and none referring to fertility change. Wilbert Moore had put this into words in 1961: "Although the links between economic development and smaller families are not fully established, it appears clear that they center in part on the institutionalization of mobility, in part an emphasis on familial (as distinct from extended kinship) values themselves".39 None of the work of Reinhard Bendix attempts to explain fertility decline,40 nor do the 25 scholars assembled by Myron Weiner in Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth.41 Marion Levy, in his double volume on Modernization and the Structure of Society, says only: "Even if we found a way to control the birth rate tomorrow by methods inoffensive to the people concerned, those methods would not preserve the general structures of relatively nonmodernized societies in their previous forms".42 Colin Clark, in 1967 in Population Growth and Land Use, said much on the impact of demographic change, but explained the fertility component of that change only in the following way: "In the 'nuclear' family the upbringing of an additional child is felt as a much greater burden than in the 'extended' family, even though, objectively, the nuclear family's economic resources may be much higher than the other's".43
It is more a question of where the burden lies than of the nature of the existence of the burden. Subsequently, in the modernizing society with nuclear families those desiring upward mobility feel, in accordance with Arsene Dumont's theory of capillarity, a very real burden — but this explains the process of fertility decline, not its origin.

There is little point in carrying this essentially negative analysis any further. The central point is that there is no detailed theory attempting to explain the beginning of fertility transition in either social change or economic change theory. There are assertions that fertility control would economically be a good thing for the wider community that go back to Malthus' race between population and food, but no explanation of the changes that lead individuals to restrict fertility. Nor is there any satisfactory analysis of the economics of societies with stable high fertility — the way nearly the whole human race has lived until the last hundred years. The important point is that fertility decline is all but ignored. If this is because it is unimportant or mechanically inevitable, then the field of demography is hardly worth sustaining. If it is because it cannot be easily explained, then the theories of change are inadequate not merely for the purposes of the demographer but in themselves.

The passing references — a few paragraphs in thousands of pages — to the origins of the fertility decline attribute it to mortality decline (without discussing whether high fertility was ever advantageous in itself), growing rationalism, the nuclearization of the family (usually in terms of shedding the shared load, and almost never in terms of changed power structures and decision-making mechanisms), changing attitudes to family size related to all the foregoing reasons, a new awareness or availability of contraception, and, amongst the household economists only, a changing economic calculus. Except for the last, these are mostly just intellectual crumbs from the demographers' table, picked up undigested in passing — Frank Notestein on religious and social supports for high fertility,45 Kingsley Davis on the traditional family,46 the KAP surveys on ideal family size and knowledge of contraception, and so on.

There has been, then, no theory of fertility decline outside the field of demography, and demographers are ill-equipped to be given sole responsibility for erecting such theory for two reasons. The first is that the existence of the discipline encourages them to seek demographic reasons — or, at least, reasons that demographers can measure with their usual tools — for demographic phenomena. The second, and most important, is that the existence of the
discipline encourages them to explain only demographic change. No theory of change is adequate that does not simultaneously explain the whole range of social, economic and demographic change (or at least provide a framework for so doing).

For the demographer, a central question is the reason for the failure of contemporary change theory.

**Toward an explanation for the failure of contemporary change theory**

The failure of change theories largely arises from the period in which they were evolved and the virtues of those who created them. Their publication (or, in the case of Inkeles and Smith, the underlying research) was in the late 1950s and 1960s, the great era of international tension and of technical aid. They are obsessed not only with change, but with the virtues of change, not only with the advantages of being "modern" but with the characteristics (almost the "virtues") of modern man.

This led to the error that vitiated them, and that defied all the rules of scientific method and what should be social scientific method. So keen were they to examine where social change was leading that they took practically no interest in what was changing and where rapid change had begun. They took only passing, and usually pejorative interest, in traditional society, and hence cut themselves off from any chance of observing the onset of change or explaining it. Often the traditional society, far from attracting research interest, seemed almost repellant (the following references all coming from a single paragraph by Inkeles and Smith): "men and women tied by the binding obligations of powerful extended kinship systems ... Some have tried to win more freedom ... They have sought to replace a closed world, in which their lives tread the narrowest circles ... From a desperate clinging to fixed ways of doing things ... fear of strangers and hostility to those very different from themselves ... rigidity and closed-mindedness ... passivity, fatalism, and the subordination of self to an immutable and inscrutable higher order". George Foster wrote, "Throughout history people in traditional societies have accepted these conditions because they knew nothing else". Some of this reaction was the result of sociologists accustomed to industrialized countries suddenly working, often briefly, in one, or a whole range, of Third World countries (anthropological literature has few parallels with the above). Some lay deep in Europe's own change from familial production - the basic theme of Marx and Durkheim - and in the circumstances of North America's settlement by migrants and often by Protestants.
A central aspect of the inadequate treatment given to the traditional society was a failure to discuss adequately its economic base, and hence to its modes of production and other circumstances which determine whether reproduction is economically advantageous or not. Foster outlined the nature of traditional society with no reference to familial production. Hagen, with a far deeper knowledge of traditional society than most change theorists, nevertheless, sought the mainsprings of behavior elsewhere: "To the peasant, life is a mystery in a profound sense in which it is not a mystery to modern man ... The major aspects of his personality, and the relationships within his community, I hypothesize, are closely related to this sense of impotence".

There is, in fact, a concentration on personality change, which often seems to go as far as implying that individuals could always have lived different ways of life merely by opting to so do, whether or not the needed economic and social institutions for the new way of life had yet come into existence. Hagen wrote that, "Traditionalism ... is a state [of mind] that may characterize any society". This view has clearly been an influence on the demographers' penchant for measuring ideal family size as a primary determinant of behavioral change. A central issue with regard to this paper, although its discussion will be left until near the end, is whether the behavior measured by "change" researchers of this type is really an index of personality at all.

Lerner identified "mobile man" who could "identify with new aspects of environment" because of "empathy" or "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation". Geographical mobility was at first the necessary catalyst but this was increasingly displaced by "psychic mobility" as "radio, film and television climax the evolution set in motion by Gutenberg". In the field the differences between traditional, transitional and modern man could be measured by the construction of scales compounded from responses to questionnaires, although (and the reason will be suggested later) the key opinion, potency and happiness scales failed to display differences of the magnitude apparently anticipated. Significantly Lerner also gave strong support to two methods of analyzing change which may ultimately be proved to generate an illusory picture of what causes what, cross-cultural comparisons and the search for variables which move together to a statistically significant extent: "Our analysis of statistical data on 73 countries around the world confirmed this view of modernization as a 'systemic' process. The demographic, economic, political, communication and cultural 'sectors' of a modernizing society grow together and this joint growth occurs in regular phases".
Inkeles (and Smith, and Miller) also adopted "the sociopsychological approach to modernization [which] treats it mainly as a process of change in ways of perceiving, expressing and valuing. The modern is defined as a mode of individual functioning, a set of dispositions to act in certain ways".\textsuperscript{57} A modern man is "an informed participant citizen", with a "marked sense of personal efficacy", "highly independent and autonomous in his relations to traditional sources of influence especially when making basic decisions about the conduct of personal affairs", "ready for new experiences and ideas" and "relatively open-minded and cognitively flexible".\textsuperscript{58} With regard to measuring the degree of change, the "solution to the problem was to derive a list of modern personal qualities from the presumed requirements of daily living in a modern and complex society, and, in particular, from the demands made on a worker or staff member in a modern industrial establishment".\textsuperscript{59} They also "started ... with the conviction that men are not born modern, but are made so by their life experience",\textsuperscript{60} and subsequently claimed to have shown that men may become modern in adulthood,\textsuperscript{61} in fact that late socialization explains as much as early socialization.\textsuperscript{62}

This approach was not marginal, but tended to represent the mainstream (and has strongly influenced demographers). As early as 1935 Mannheim had been arguing that "a transformation of society is inconceivable without the transformation of the human personality".\textsuperscript{63} In the early 1960s David McClelland was measuring the "impulse to economic growth" by the index $M_AcH$ or the "need for achievement", calculated from literature from the time of archaic Greece and from children's readers in the contemporary developed and Third World.\textsuperscript{64} Hagen was searching for the innovational and authoritarian personalities that determine the likelihood of the succeeding generation having a need for achievement.\textsuperscript{65} Kellert, Williams, Whyte and Alberti were in Peru, defining modernization as the "conflict between people who want to do things in the old ways and those who want to do things in the new ways", and accordingly trying to distinguish a "group with old customs" from "a group with modern ideas".\textsuperscript{66} Black was also arguing the partial replacement among modernizing influences of physical migration by "the people's heightened awareness, through vastly expanded means of communication".\textsuperscript{67} Joseph Kahl argued that the fundamental motive force was the "modernization of values",\textsuperscript{68} and when he found a difference between reported ideal family size in Mexico and Brazil during the 1960s, he wrote: "I suspect that these differences are related to some old traditions within the Portuguese and Spanish cultures that were transferred to the New World, and possibly to some differences between the Negro contribution in Brazil and that of the Indian in Mexico".\textsuperscript{69}
Amongst the economists, Rostow argued not the changing economy but the necessary new ideas of national dignity, private property, the general welfare and a better life for children: 70 "New types of enterprising men come forward – in the private economy, in government, or both – willing to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit of profit or modernization.71 This happens most often now because of "external intrusions": these invasions – literal or figurative – shocked the traditional society and began or hastened its undoing; but they also set in mind ideas and sentiments which initiated the process by which a modern alternative to the traditional society was constructed out of the old culture".72

Fundamental problems in change theory

Change theory of this type raises difficulties for understanding general social and economic change and hence its demographic component. Five problems will be examined here. Much of the discussion cannot be focused on demographic change because change theory so rarely mentions fertility transition. But an analysis of its problems does throw light on why this omission occurs.

(1) the neglect of fundamental institutional change. For most of human history the family, in its wider or narrower sense, has been the subsistence producing and consuming unit. Individuals with other ideas about how and where they wanted to live, far from creating modern society, would usually have faced disaster. Familial production of this kind, like the succeeding capitalist production, was governed by a set of rules in conformity with the power structure. Although these were usually obeyed, always supported by adage and custom, and often incorporated into religion, scepticism or hostility with regard to them usually did not create alternative employment – when migration to seek non-familial employment became possible on a considerable scale the world was already changing. The family power structure, and the respect it demanded, was maintained by access to land (or areas in which to hunt and forage). For reasons discussed elsewhere fertility is likely to remain high in societies of this kind.73 Such societies could be stable without central governments; indeed the demands of governments posed some threat to the familial morality that justified the family power structure.74 Where such government existed, its power structure tended to be modelled on the family, and governing elites were small (partly because the surplus of production over
subsistence needs was small). Where capitalist production emerges, only a government can enforce law and morality to allow it to operate.

The emphasis on personality, attitudes and behavior misleads us about the fundamental changes, even though it might tell us something about a transient persistence in the rules or superstructure (but see below) which explained a relatively short persistence in some behavioral patterns such as unrestricted fertility.75

Firstly, it misconstrues the basic nature of a society based on familial production, especially the fundamental importance of land and the lack of other employment or access to food and other requisites. Thus Hagen reported with seeming surprise, "the ownership, or if this is not possible, the proprietorship, of land is more vital to the peasant than perhaps any other aspect of his material life".76 "Such a thing as an individual business venture is virtually unknown. Every economic act is taken in the name of the family and the associates in economic activity are members of the family".77 Foster reported that, "The demands of urbanization, industrialization, and a monetary economy usually are congenial to the extended family groupings of subsistence peoples",78 and that "the factors that determine these motivations are cultural, social and psychological".79

Often it is the power structure or relations of production that are seen almost as optional choices. Hagen wrote: The [Surmese] family is a unit created to serve the needs of the father",80 "As the child grows, if he is a boy he becomes more of a rival to his father. Hence the father finds that the time has come for training, and he consistently quiets, subdues, and represses the child".81 [This] "also is in accord with the need dominance of parents. Their world image and their need dominance interact, each reinforcing the other".82 "One must conclude that the hierarchical structure of authority and power in traditional societies has been so stable because the simple folk as well as the elite accepted it. The simple folk must feel satisfaction in depending for decisions and direction on individuals above them".83 "If a hierarchical authoritarian social structure persists for centuries (as it has in traditional societies), it must be concluded that the members of the society found it satisfactory, and did so because in childhood they found such a structure of relationships the best solution to the problems they faced".84
Even the emergence of the State is often seen almost as a choice. "A modern nation needs participating citizens, men and women who take an active interest in public affairs and who exercise their rights and perform their duties as members of a community larger than that of the kinship network and immediate geographic locality".85 "Where traditionalism is present ... behavior is governed by custom, not law".86 The sequence is wrong. It sounds as if an interest within the traditional family in national and international affairs produces a new economy and new state apparatus (indeed this is the only interpretation possible of the stress that both Lerner and Inkeles place on the significance of opinions on these matters), rather than a non-familial economy bringing employees out into a world where these matters are now important to them. It is, indeed, curious what interest has been aroused by Lerner's Turkish peasant who declared, "My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I ... I cannot ... president of Turkey ... master of the whole world?"87 and by Inkeles' Pakistani farmer who punctuated the interview by declaring, "I am but a foolish man; what can I say?"88

Unwilling to give priority to changes in the modes of production, attitudinal and behavioral change theorists are almost forced to explain change in terms of social deviance, often ignoring the range of deviance and of specialized roles and occupations existing over eons in stable traditional societies. Hagen decided that the basic cause of change "is the perception on the part of the members of some social group that their purposes and values in life are not respected by groups in the society whom they respect and whose esteem they value."89 Nigel Crook showed that such an approach could be used to provide a theoretical framework for a micro-study investigating fertility decline in a single Indian village,90 only provided firstly that one assumed economic change that affected the cost of children, and hence secondly relinquished any claim to be investigating the origin of economic change and the total succession of events precipitating fertility decline. "What is crucial then is the distribution of potential deviants in the village".91

Often the stresses perceived in traditional society (which does indeed have stresses even if in a stable situation that has only a
potential for inducing change) are largely those of transitional society where familial production and its morality have already been substantially eroded. Clearly this was the case of Lerner's traditional village before transition, Balgat, eight kilometres from Ankara, and soon to be denuded of its land by the growth of the city.\textsuperscript{92} Indeed his dichotomies between traditional and modern are largely the contrasts between living within a system of familial production and living outside it: village versus town, land versus cash, illiteracy versus enlightenment(!), resignation versus ambition, and piety versus excitement.\textsuperscript{93}

(2) an emphasis on simultaneous data and a neglect of history.

Change theorists concentrate almost entirely on changing societies. Neither they nor demographers ever devote sufficient time to determining how stable traditional societies of familial production and high fertility work. Most analysis is done from cross-sectional data on the assumption of a linear continuity of attitudes and behavior. This has been hailed as a decisive advance: "A new spirit was abroad in the 1960s which was more eclectic, less ideological, more interdisciplinary. The lead was taken by economists in the study of what they called development or growth. Relying heavily on factor analysis, they sought to identify the common socioeconomic characteristics of the 'advanced' countries and to discover the common paths, if any, that had led to economic growth".\textsuperscript{94} Such an approach could not of course identify paths let alone origins. However, Kahl maintained that such analysis could establish that socioeconomic status was the primary determinant of the emergence of modern attitudes.\textsuperscript{95} Allan Schnaiberg claimed, "We can certainly link modernism as a whole to the process of urbanization, the spread of education and literacy, and presumably the development of an industrial urban base".\textsuperscript{96}

There has been counterattack. Bendix wrote of the "over-simplification [resulting] from heavily ideological interpretations of the contrast between tradition and modernity, and from undue generalizations of the European experience",\textsuperscript{97} and argued that "studies of social change are not possible without a 'before-and-after' model of the social structure in question".\textsuperscript{98} Feldman and Hurn charged that "while most of the sociological assertions about modernization employ a rhetoric of behavior, the data are hardly
ever observations of behavioral changes"; 
and that "they are almost never longitudinal data". 

A telling defense is that society before change cannot be located, that there are no origins, but only mile-posts. This should not, of course, prevent real comparisons over time or more thoroughgoing investigations of the natures of societies characterized by very different levels of familial production (cross-cultural comparisons are much more dangerous because cultural phenomena really are being compared across cultures). However, such investigations really should be possible — and should be a gift to all change theory — of fertility decline. We do have origins. Almost within living memory, fertility nearly everywhere was a high as it had ever been, and this is still the case over much of the Third World. We should be able to investigate stable high fertility in its own right and not as an anomaly that has resisted change.

There is another problem in using cross-sectional data to interpret change which is serious, although neglected, and may help to explain a good deal of the misunderstanding of the mechanism of change. Most of the interpretation is based on being able to prove a statistically significant difference between the behavior of two or more groups — or rather of two or more temporary subdivisions of the respondents divided for this purpose by a single characteristic or by a set of characteristics, taken really, one at a time. There are several drawbacks. Firstly, the respondents may be divisible into quite different groups by each apparently significant characteristic, and the compound formed hypothetically by combining the most modernized and most traditional characteristics may not represent real groups of importance in the community. Secondly, those characteristics which yield the most significantly diverse distributions may merely be relatively superficial characteristics determined by deeper underlying characteristics. For instance, whether the respondents had arranged marriages or not (often used as an explanatory variable when examining the likelihood of using contraception) may largely reflect whether they came from a family farm or business or not and hence whether the control of the younger generation was vitally important to the parents or not. Thirdly, some characteristics are chosen for analysis (or, more often, for data collection in the first place) and others forgotten according
to an underlying - and often hidden and unstated - hypothesis or according to what other researchers have collected and found significant according to their unstated hypotheses (a kind of accelerator principle operates). Fourthly, and perhaps most seriously, if the sample is large enough even small differences can be described as "highly significant" (and ironically researchers argue with funding organizations for larger samples just so small differences can be so described). Thus the importance of the duration of education is said to be proved if 70 per cent of persons with secondary education do something compared with only 67 per cent of persons with primary education (one needs around 3,500 respondents with such schooling to show significance at the 5 per cent level and 7,000 at the one per cent level). The real significance is, of course, that most persons with both primary and secondary education do behave in this way, while another important point is that substantial minorities of both groups do not. If both proportions are rising with time (as they did, for instance, with contraceptive use in the West, then the real point may be that the time lag is only two years). Fifthly, this kind of research approach apparently allows researchers from the West to transfer their expertise immediately to Third World countries, and to write subsequent reports as if the data analysis by standard methods either spoke for itself or was subject to a universal interpretation with, at the most, a few footnotes to show that historical or anthropological sources had been glanced at. All these points suggest that fundamental misunderstandings can arise about the nature of social change and its origins. That these approaches are used can be confirmed by leafing through the pages of any social science journal which gives some interest to the Third World and which has a leaning towards the analysis of large data sets rather than an historical, theoretical or anthropological approach (in the population field, the journal Demography, strongly influenced by those with a background in "quantitative" sociology, is an example).

(3) the scales employed. Even if one were not worried about the nature of change, or the concepts used to define and measure it, one might well stop short at accepting the findings of the scales commonly employed. For instance, Stephenson reports that he accepts the Smith-Inkeles definition of modernization, but denies that their own
scales have in any way measured it.\textsuperscript{103} I agree with his criticism, partly agree with his reservations about persons from one culture devising scales for another culture,\textsuperscript{104} let alone a set of them, and then totally disagree with his own definition upon which his measures are based. That definition is: "Modernization is the movement of persons or groups along a cultural dimension from what is defined by the cultural norms as traditional toward what is defined by the same culture as modern. Those values defined in the local culture as traditional comprise what may be called tradionalism; those defined as modernism constitute modernism".\textsuperscript{105} Until recently, truly traditional societies had little idea what was modern, only what was either deviant or delinquent. Even now much depends on whether they take the word "modern" or its translation to be used in an approving or disapproving sense. If in the former sense (and sometimes in the latter sense) it will probably be taken to mean Western, or just American. In any case the answers will probably be as superficial - and will certainly be entirely attitudinal and behavioral, revealing nothing about the fundamental forces of change in the society - as those from an American or European respondent would be. The responses in some societies might emphasize what the powerful do, and in others what the young do, even if this has not meant in the past that the poor or the young once they have grown older subsequently act the same way. Feldman and Burren complained, "The stage to which they belong is typically judged by their occupation".\textsuperscript{106} The problem about the improved scales is that they make judgements based on a great number of measures worse than occupation. In fact occupation, or at least the setting of that occupation within a production mode, may be the only appropriate measure.

Certainly the contents of the scales are alarming to any demographer who intends to use them as an independent measure of the restriction of fertility according to placing on a traditional-modern continuum. The narrower reason is that they are not independent of fertility, and accordingly inevitably tend to move with fertility decline. Indeed, when Inkeles attempted in 1969 to set down the personality qualities which identify modern man, the first quality to be listed was "openness to new experience, both with people and with new ways of doing things such as attempting to control births".\textsuperscript{107} The Inkeles and Smith core attitude scale (OM-1) includes ideal family
size, and attitudes to both birth control and the oral contraceptive. Indeed, the latter question incorporates the assumption that there is always a negative relationship between high fertility and economic well-being and begins by informing the respondent: "A man and his wife have several children. This is as many as they can afford ....". Their expanded attitude scale (OM-2) includes in addition a question on the number of children you would have if you were well off (and tells the respondent that there is a relationship between economic condition and ability to educate children and implies an obligation to educate them), a question on whether one would follow the lead of a government advising the limitation of the size of the family (it is apparently modern to bow to the Government) and a question on the relative responsibility of each spouse when practicing contraception. The broader reason is that this is only one set of questions among a series of sets on an interrelated complex of attitudinal and behavioral changes which often tend to move together. There are other sets of questions on matters almost inextricably related to the value of children and the likelihood that fertility control will prove advantageous: kinship obligations (two questions in the core and three more in the expanded scale); women's rights (seven in the core and three more in the expanded scale); aging and the aged (one in the core and an extra one in the expanded scale). The other 23 sets of questions, ranging from active public participation to citizenship and from dignity to time valuation, have exactly the same drawbacks. They gauge certain changes at a certain point in time. They explain nothing about the origin of change or about the force that keeps it moving. Masses of questions do offer evidence on the change from familial production to employment on the non-familial capitalist labor market but they are never interpreted this way (all but one of the dignity questions are either about the patriarch's economic relations or those involving control of his wife or son or about labor control relationships in factories). There is nothing in the analysis suggesting that fundamental transformations in the economy are of importance (except for their environmental impact, such as the experience of working in a factory). The basic explanation for change is on the role of the media in providing individuals with greater data banks of information, with little concern for the fact that information that is significant in one way of life may not be in another.
The emphasis on Inkeles and Smith here does not arise from their weaknesses, but because of their influence (on demographers as well as other social scientists) and because of the details they have provided about their methodology and viewpoint. In fact most other attempts to scale social change have also concentrated on the results rather than the forces of change. An investigation of traditional behavior amongst Chinese in Hong Kong\textsuperscript{109} scaled and analyzed attitudes to family size, parental desire for sons, chastity as a supreme virtue, gifts in social and interpersonal relations, brideprice, parental discipline, the higher status of males, polygamy, respect for the aged, husband dominance and paternal government without mentioning the functions of these institutions in traditional familial production, without indeed mentioning such activities except for questions on "farming as an honorable institution". Sometimes scaling concentrates on a single theme, said to be the basic mechanism for change, such as the investigation of the decline of cooperation and the rise of competitiveness carried out by Meeker in Liberia and Bethlehem in Zambia.\textsuperscript{110}

(4) the neglect of cultural diffusion: modernization versus westernization. Much attention is given to the formation of a global economy, and very little to the establishment of a global society. Cultural diffusion is a part of everyday experience and concern from Western Europe to remote parts of the Third World. But it is not a significant element in social change theory. This may be very misleading in terms of the anticipated rate of change and of the timing of such events as the onset of fertility decline.

Modernization is that degree of social change which inevitably accompanies economic change because the new economic order demands it - anything less would be grossly inefficient and even chaotic. The factory hand, at least during his working hours, must obey his boss and not seek guidance from his father, and he must obey the factory's or the government's rules about not stealing the equipment even if the possession of such equipment would please his father and benefit the whole family (this is an idealized model - reality will be discussed in the next section). Westernization is the social change over and above this which results from importing aspects of the Western way of life. There is a huge indeterminant middle ground, because Western ways of life, though imported because newspapers say they are more
fashionable or missionaries more virtuous, have been more honed to an industrial way of life (or at least one centering on non-familial production) and may fit in better with the new economic system and may raise individual productivity at the same level of capital investment. In this sense the West, and especially its anglosaxon part has been largely modernized (although there has also been a complex pattern of cultural diffusion), while Westernization has been an important aspect of the Third World experience. Thus behavior patterns, which are only dictated over the long-term by economic change, may move at a faster rate relative to economic change than occurred in the West—children may become economically disadvantageous and fertility may fall at an earlier time.

The study of these different rates, and of the cultural diffusion which gives rise to them, would seem to be basic to a study of social change—particularly among those concentrating on attitudinal and concomitant behavioral change. No such emphases have appeared, for complex reasons.

Marx in his earlier writing was clearly willing to regard the superstructure as only loosely tied to the dictates of the changing modes of production, but later opted for more direct economic determinism and downplayed the role of both social and economic diffusion even in Western Europe. In fact the reasons for downplaying diffusion have often been ideological and even almost political. Lerner, who, from every description, clearly regards the cultural flow from the West as being of fundamental importance in the Middle East (for instance, "The nations of the North Atlantic area first developed the social processes ... by which this state of mind ["modernity"] came to prevail" ... From the West came the stimuli which undermined traditional society in the Middle East; for the reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model") shies away from any definition along these lines: "modernization appears as Westernization by historical coincidence ... The Western model must ... be freed from the constraints of ethnocentrism in order to function effectively". "Any label that today localizes the process is bound to be parochial. For Middle Easterners more than ever want the modern package, but reject the label 'made in U.S.A.' (or, for that matter, 'made in U.S.S.R.'). We speak, nowadays, of modernization". Inkeles
seems to waver between considering Westernization a tactless concept and a wrong one. "Some may, therefore, insist that such individuals [ones who score high on the OM scales] have become 'Westernized', or at least more like Westerners. I prefer to think of them as having become more modern, because I personally find it more appropriate to think of the qualities which make up the modernity syndrome as not being the distinctive property of any single cultural tradition ... I see little to be gained by spilling a great deal of ink over the issue. It seems much less important to settle the issue of whether individual modernity is Western or not than it is to decide what consequences follow from its spread".117 He adds, "some sort of psychological Westernization may be a practical necessity for any country which seeks to modernize its institutions ... Each nation and each people should be free to make the choice either to import the set of institutions which are generally considered to be modern, to live as they have always lived, to borrow some other pattern, or to invent wholly new institutional patterns of their own".118 This seems clear enough but then follows an extraordinary attestation of psychological and attitudinal autonomy: "Imperialism can export Coca-Cola, blue jeans, Hollywood movies, and capital-intensive production. But it cannot export individual modernity. Individual modernity may develop as a response to prior colonial action, but, being built into the psyches of the people, it must of necessity be a native product, home grown, no matter how foreign was the origin of the seed".119 Black, in a search for "the characteristics of modernity that may be assumed to be of universal validity",120 and agreeing that cultural diffusion is important,121 then defines modernization so as to lose any meaning beyond "change" and to avoid the issue of how much follows inevitably from the arrival of new economic institutions: "The advantage of a term such as 'modernization' is not only that it has a broader scope than 'Westernization', 'Europeanization', 'industrialization', or even 'progress', but also that it is less encumbered with accretions of meaning".122 The fact of the matter is that the clarification of exactly what has happened and is still happening is of vital importance. In the demographic field it helps to provide an answer to the question as to whether Third World countries have to attain the levels of urbanization, non-agricultural employment and real per capita income of Britain
of a century ago before they can expect fertility to decline or whether the fact that it has already declined elsewhere is of significance, either because the practice and its ethos can be imported or because some predetermining social change can be unwittingly or wittingly imported.

Not all treatments of change restrict social change to meeting the minimum needs of economic change or being dictated by economic change. Some suggest a certain primacy for social change, which implies a far greater potential significance for Westernization. Feldman and Hurn averred that, "Modernization refers to those social changes that generate institutions and organizations like those found in advanced industrial countries", and Davis that, "economic modernization requires a large amount of individual movement in the social hierarchy". Inkeles and Smith avoided explaining the impact of schooling in terms of an imported, and hence Westernizing, message, and the impact of factories merely in terms of a new set of rules or relationships for a new mode of production by treating both as institutions inevitably imparting implicit lessons not designed purposively. The school changed the personality by reward and punishment, exemplification, modeling and generalization, while adults were imbued with new personal qualities from the "requirements of daily living in a modern and complex society, and, in particular, from the demands made on a worker or staff member in a modern industrial establishment".

What occurred in Europe and what is happening in the contemporary Third World is complex with everywhere differences in accent because of specific cultural contexts. Bendix has argued that the European change was far more complex, riddled with idiosyncracies derived from European history, than the historical models of it, let alone those derivations employed by change theorists. One reason for debate, even for denying Westernization when it is patently there, has been that the cultural changes are more painful and from the individual's viewpoint more basic than the economic ones; as Robert Bellah wrote, "Modernization, whatever else it involves, is always a moral and religious problem" — one of values and meanings. Both what is exported and what is imported are far from being general products suited exactly to the economic situation: "We cannot easily separate modernity and tradition from some specific tradition and
some specific modernity ... The modern comes to the traditional society as a particular culture with its own traditions — and that, in terms of current Westernization, includes contemporary Western traditions about intergenerational relations and about family limitation.

No real attempt can be made to explore individual examples of change, but passing reference might be made to two cases, Sri Lanka which appears to have experienced more social than economic change, and where mortality and fertility have both experienced substantial declines, and Japan, the first non-Western country to industrialize and to attain low birth rates. Much remains to be done to explain change in Sri Lanka, but the evidence is growing, and it points to massive Westernization, such as is found in many oceanic islands and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Kerala. Michael Ames concludes that, "Ceylon has become Westernized in institutions, values and aspirations without a corresponding degree of economic modernization", in a situation where "Christianity was freely identified with the scientific civilization of the west, in fact as its wellspring", and where the proportion of literate males and females in 1900 was similar to the pattern in India and Pakistan in 1961, while the proportion attending in 1930 paralleled Indonesia in 1961. He details how easy it is to identify a movement as largely indigenous or anti-Westernization when the impact is Westernizing by analyzing the nature of the Buddhist revival from the second half of the nineteenth century: "The ways in which Buddhists responded to the threat of westernization were obviously influenced by the very things against which they reacted ... They copied, or reasserted, their own Buddhist counterparts of the dominant western attitudes: the belligerent puritanism, the individualism, this-worldly activism, technological rationalism, scepticism and utilitarianism of the Christians." Japan is of interest because the same history can be seen as one of indigenous change with little Westernization, or as one where Western influence was decisive. Hagen goes so far as to survey the experience of Japan, India, China and Indonesia in terms of social and economic change and then to conclude, "Clearly the effects of contact with Western knowledge, disruption of traditional culture, and availability of resources either were irrelevant or were nullified by other influences" — and this from a major change theorist.
(5) change in personality, attitude, behavior or the rules? This is the fundamental question and is all but ignored. It has enormous significance for demographic behavior and for social change theory. If much of the behavior and attitudes measured are merely what the actors do or say in a specific economic context, then the social change scales are meaningless except as evidence of that context. The same is true for measurements of demographic behavior. This examination begins to focus some of the worries raised in the previous sections.

Massive change in economic relationships have occurred over much of the world. In traditional societies of the past, perhaps 90 per cent of the population were peasants,¹³⁹ and many of the remainder were merchants or craftsmen who used their families for production in the same way as do peasants. This world has passed, and in much of the Third World two-fifths of occupations are for wages usually paid by non-relatives.¹⁴⁰ Familial production was governed by rules which tended to benefit the powerful - the old and the male - and these rules were embedded in morality and theology.¹⁴¹ In non-familial production, people had different relationships and espoused different moralities.

But this is a model. Bendix has warned that real Europe was never as simple as this,¹⁴² and neither is the contemporary Third World. Great numbers of people live not in one or other of these two systems but in both either simultaneously or in alternation. For generations the assertion, that "separation has taken place first, and perhaps most dramatically, between family and economic occupational roles",¹⁴³ is not generally true. It is also not true that "the chance to get ahead by dint of effort rather than by virtue of birth stimulates people to work harder";¹⁴⁴ they work in the different contexts within the rules and according to the pressures applied and the rewards offered. Even in a traditional society, men behaved in a different way, according to a different morality, when they were in the King's Army than when they were back with kinsfolk on the farm. There is much to the charge that in change theory, "Rural populations are perceived as stereotypically traditional, and urban populations as stereotypically modern [while] transitional populations are thought to be marginal, subject to strains, anomic, etc."¹⁴⁵
In point of fact descriptions of the more varied real world often emphasize our societies and individuals can live in two worlds. In neither Mexico nor India is the Great Tradition a feature only of the towns and the Little Tradition of the villages: Pauline Kolenda has demonstrated very well why the version of Hinduism aimed at solving more immediate wants and fears meets most of the needs of the rural population, but how the version that surveys the eons past and ahead is known and can be adjusted to by the rural-urban migrant or the boy upwardly mobile through school. \(^{146}\) Gusfield makes the point also about India, "Almost always the Indian intellectual speaks a regional language as his mother tongue, is steeped in classic Sanskrit literature, and is deeply tied to an extended family. Parental arrangement is still the very dominant mode of marital selection, and he is often married to a highly traditional wife". \(^{147}\) Crook's village deviants\(^{148}\) were there even in the stable village; most villagers were probably deviant in some way, and nearly all could be deviant if a different situation offered itself. Lerner's people of Balgat had not had a personality change in those four short years from 1950 to 1954\(^{149}\) - not even modern communications could do that. It was merely that a different situation had offered itself (and, if one takes that standpoint, the whole book can be read differently).

The most important different situation is a job on the open labor market in contrast to working within the family system. But the immediate contrast for the individual is usually not the one of full transition from one system to the other; that is the course of the whole society over generations. It is not the case that the lingering elements of the old way of life "constitute a serious deterrent to the introduction of new and improved production techniques, since a progressive individual's greater income may be drained away in maintaining traditional forms of hospitality and help to relatives". \(^{150}\) Except in conditions of very rapid economic change this is an unreal situation. The usual one in Africa and South Asia is described by Moore and Feldman, "In many cases the real problem, which has not been given adequate recognition, is that industrialization in developing areas has not given workers sufficient opportunity to make a clean break with the past. The industrial worker is unwilling to give up even the meagre economic and emotional security offered by the family, tribe, or village for low wages, inadequate housing,
insecure job tenure, separation from family, poor supervision, language difficulties, racial discrimination, and lack of status and sense of belonging".\textsuperscript{151} Claude Meillassoux has emphasized that the wages are often low because the familial support is available.\textsuperscript{152} The actual position is even more complex than this. Industry would not exist in some areas but for the fact that the family system allows low wages to be paid. The fact the workers live between two worlds — two sets of economic rules — allows them to bend both sets of rules: they need not be quite so deferential to the patriarch and they can be somewhat casual about obeying the boss's instructions to be at work punctually every day. This quite conscious optimizing of their life style makes them more traditional on the Inkeles-Smith scale (they fail all the Time Valuation questions, as well as most of the Work Commitment, Aspirations, Efficacy and Planning ones).\textsuperscript{153} Often both individuals and families live in both the old and new systems getting what they can from each. There is usually not even a conflict in values; the system of values from one world is used to maximize returns from the other.\textsuperscript{154} The patriarch emphasizes the duty to the older generation and the son who has a job in town gives not only deference but a sizable amount of his earnings. The son's job is threatened or he faces an unwanted transfer, and the patriarch talks to a neighbor so that the latter's son, who has a key post in the employing organization, takes action to remove the threat.

The essential point is that in much of our present world, where transition is still occurring from familial production to a completely non-familial system, people can, and do, live and work in both systems, with an awareness and a respect for the moral orders of each system. In the West this has been going on for centuries; the male household head goes out to work, espousing to his fellow workers a certain morality and world view appropriate to their working together in the market place, and then he returns home where his wife (and, until this century, his children) are producing domestic goods and services in a system of familial production which he encourages by a philosophy of family virtue, loyalty, and gratitude, quite different from the morality he expects to bind himself and his employer.\textsuperscript{155} This is not hypocrisy; people regard the morality as being suited to the mode of production. In the Third World, one often seems to meet a different
man, a much more traditional one, if after knowing him while employed in the town, one searches him out, after his sacking, back in the village, living in the extended family compound and working beside his brothers and under his father on a subsistence farm. He will talk in a different way than he did in the town, and may even voice different views (even in private - although it should be noted that most survey interviews in the Third World are not carried out in private).

I am not arguing that a man back in the village reverts completely to his former unawareness of the outside world. In the village the people who have worked in the town are distinguishable from those who have not\textsuperscript{156} (although they often only parade their knowledge of the outside world to a visitor from that world). But these are almost parlour tricks. The important point is that they have not forgotten the lifestyle and the priorities of the village. They can fit back into it again without clumsiness and usually without resentment. They know the advantages of the town job, but they usually will not begin even to weaken the links with the family unless they are completely convinced that a town job is assured for a lifetime and that the extended family can no longer help or hinder.

In the town a man sees and hears things not heard in the village. He has to answer more quickly and often make decisions at his job especially if it is an unsupervised one; at home in the village such quickness and the taking on of such responsibility would justifiably make his brothers and father suspicious. In the town he must put on a show of working hard; in the village he must put on a show of deferring to age and experience. In the town he must sound as if community or national interests come first, and in the village as if family ones do. In the town he must talk to strangers; politics is one possibility, partly because it is a common experience, and partly because government does have a greater bearing on the lives of townsmen. But, and this is the crucial point, it is not these discussions or the fact that he knows the President's name that propelled him towards acquiring his town job; he knows these things because they are relevant once he has a town job. Nor will this knowledge make him overthrow the familial morality of the village if he has to work there.
How are these transition circumstances seen by the change theorists? Inkeles and Smith "proposed, then, to classify as modern those personal qualities which are likely to be inculcated by participation in large-scale modern productive enterprises such as the factory, and, perhaps more critical, which may be required of the workers and the staff if the factory is to operate efficiently and effectively".\textsuperscript{157} They noted that, "In actual fact, the personal qualities defined as modern in many different researches show a remarkable degree of overlap. Variants on the themes of fatalism, empathy, efficacy, innovativeness, flexibility, achievement, orientation, information, and active citizenship abound. Almost as frequently ... stress, alienation and anomie".\textsuperscript{158} In other words, people in town jobs behave the way they are expected to do, and, if they are rural-urban migrants, show the strains exhibited by most displaced persons. These characteristics were measured by batteries of questions which did little more than confirm the two different ways. Sometimes they showed an appalling inability to empathise with traditional familial production and its morality, such as the preliminary sentence in an Inkeles and Smith question on Kinship Obligations: "Some people say that a boy should be taught to give preference to a friend or relative, even when others have a more rightful claim".\textsuperscript{159}

What did they find? Inkeles and Smith found that, "A good deal was foreshadowed by whether a man was born in the countryside or in the city",\textsuperscript{160} and that "the UNIs [those in urban non-industrial employment] consistently outperformed [i.e. gave fewer "traditional" responses] the cultivators, who provided our baseline of disadvantage".\textsuperscript{161} One might conclude that this shows that those born in the countryside are more likely still to have links with familial agriculture and to express views showing those links. But the conclusions drawn were that, "To some extent, the rural setting from the start, inculcates traditional attitudes",\textsuperscript{162} that farming gives a man "little opportunity to develop his modernity",\textsuperscript{163} and that "few things in the nature of their work stimulated them to new ways of looking at things, to a heightened sense of personal efficacy, or to any of the other changes which would have made them more modern".\textsuperscript{164} These conclusions were drawn in spite of the discovery that the type of home and school background was not very important,\textsuperscript{165} and the "important surprize ... that the men in certain nonindustrial occupations, such
cabdrivers, newspaper vendors, barbers, and street hawkers, showed rather more modernity than we had assumed\textsuperscript{166} – i.e. the uneducated in non-familial employment. They were drawn also in spite of the finding that people could become "modern in adult life by accepting a factory job.\textsuperscript{167} Some of the findings on information, taken by the researchers to be significant, showed how little "information" means except in its job and lifestyle context: workers in fairly large, and often unionized, factories were shown to be more likely to have heard of Moscow than were village farmers.\textsuperscript{168} Even Lerner's happiness index,\textsuperscript{169} which he used to establish that the traditional man was less happy, is at one with fatalism scales; there are good reasons in the traditional family why individuals should not announce their success too jubilantly or create too much fuss about disasters, even the death of children.

The important point is that questions of this kind measure the occupational transition by measuring many things that move at the same time. They do not predict the future. They do not explain the changes except that they appear to be associated with movement from traditional familial farming. They do not explain why such movement is occurring, and they certainly do not add to our knowledge that fertility decline is likely to start at some time in that process, let alone what determines the timing.

**The mutual contributions and potential contributions of social and economic change theories and demographic change theories**

Any hope that demographers might have that they might understand more about the onset of fertility decline if they delved deeper into the explanations offered by social and economic change theory for the onset of change is likely to be dashed. Such theory has very little to say about fertility decline, not because it is not thought to be important, but because the theory does not begin to have the apparatus for dealing with the problem – or, indeed, for other problems of social and economic change. The theorists' approach is wrong in the failure both to research pre-existing society and in the emphasis on attitudes and deviance. Among the social change theorists this is probably explained by a desire to use only the tools of their own disciplines (sociology and social psychology) and by a social engineer's excitement in producing modern man – people like us. A similar excitement seems to have motivated the economic change theorists.
There is unlikely to be much understanding of the onset of change until we know a great deal more about the traditional family and about familial production, mostly in peasant farming but also in traditional artisan and commercial groups. Economic anthropologists have done something on exchange relationships but much less on relative labor inputs and consumption patterns within the family that is the essence of this mode of production. Other anthropologists have devoted a great deal of attention to kinship relations, but very little to the internal power structure within the family and the decision-making apparatus which determines individuals' "standards of living". The field of peasant studies has devoted more attention to political movements than to the nature of the peasant economy. Work is not only needed on the age-old peasant family economy, but on families with members working partly outside them, or working wholly outside them for some periods only. Work is needed on the Western family, especially in the nineteenth century, and perhaps on the Middle Eastern urban family today, to discover the economic and demographic implications of marked divisions of labor by sex and generation with the females, and perhaps the young males, providing labor for the household as a subsistence production unit.

This is the route the demographer must also follow. It is pointless to go along with the social change theorists in emphasizing the measurement of changing ideal family size and attitudes to contraception. Even the measurement of fertility and contraception change is merely confirmation that something more fundamental in the society is also changing.

There is almost certainly only one way forward, and that is to assume (and attempt to prove) that the economic advantages of high fertility have declined. We need to note such findings as those of Saad Gadalla in rural Egypt\textsuperscript{170} that economic reasons dominate both high fertility motives and low fertility ones and that a shift toward desiring low fertility has been occasioned by an almost silent but complex economic change: "The villagers are aware of the increased costs of food, clothing, medical care, and education which they are providing their children. They even frequently compare how little it used to cost their own parents to feed and clothe them with what it costs today. They also compare how limited and simple their needs were and how diverse and complicated their children's needs are now. They realize that everyday general expenses are much higher year after year. In short, they are sensitive to the economic costs of rearing children, aware that a large family costs more to support and maintain than a small one, and encountering much more economic difficulty in raising their families than did their parents and
grandparents". We need to investigate that increasing difficulty very carefully for some of the changes are subtle. I have used the term "net wealth flows" to try to define the net difficulty - the losses minus the gains from children - and have attempted to show just how complex the impact of one factor, education, is.

I believe that we will be able to show that the fertility decline occurred because children changed from being on the whole an economic advantage to an economic disadvantage. I do not think that anyone has been able to show that peasant families, practicing subsistence agriculture, are relatively disadvantaged by large families, at least from the vantage point of the patriarch, or other decision-maker, and when the balance sheet is worked out over a lifetime - our evidence seems to point in the opposite direction. But adequate research on this point is not the end of the road. We must examine the economics of the transitional family - of the returns to the patriarch and to the son who works in the town, of their continued economic relationship, and of what it economically implies for the fertility of both father and son. Under what conditions will the son, or the grandson, restrict his fertility? In extended families how are fertility decisions made, for clearly it is the economic context of the fertility decision-maker we must keep in mind? I believe that we will ultimately show that the driving force of change in the wholeness of high fertility is the change from one mode of production to another - from familial to capitalist production - but that the point at which high fertility (or all fertility) becomes uneconomic can vary by decades, and perhaps in parts of the historic West, by generations, according to such social factors as whether children are taught to work hard and live austerely or not and according to whether mass education upsets the ability to maintain their hard working and relatively austere consumption situation. It is because of slippage of this order that the differentiation between minimum home-grown change and Westernization becomes important.

If demographers can tease out something close to the full pattern, they can teach change theorists a great deal more than the value of the scraps of theory and conventional belief that they have already presented. Ironically, they might also move economic change theorists more toward economic analysis, and might convince them that one of the great changes in human relations occurred in the transition from familial to non-familial production, a change suitably attested by the one significant transition in family size.

The point here is not that some demographers have not been working along the right lines, but that their canvases have not been large enough. Freedman in the early 1960s concluded that the explanation of fertility decline lay in
the fact that "industrial urbanization was associated with a much more complex division of labour". Lorimer, in 1965, had attempted to demonstrate how transition from agrarian to industrial production changed the balance of production over consumption through the life cycle in such a way as to make children a greater economic burden, but he failed to grapple with the problem of how internal family relationships might yield very different consumption patterns (taking consumption in its broadest sense) by age and sex in different societies. Others have noted the relationship between economic change - or rising income - and fertility decline, sometimes cautiously postulating the major impact to come through such secondary factors as rising education and declining mortality.

Nevertheless, a fully satisfactory theory of demographic transition is unlikely to be distinguishable from a fully satisfactory theory of social and economic change from a system of familial production to one of non-familial production. In neither case will the theory be adequate unless it can explain not merely the fact of fertility decline but the timing of its onset. Nor will it be satisfactory if it appears to deal with autonomous economies or societies, and fails to explain the role of exportable change. Demographers and others would almost certainly find it of great value to concentrate more on the intrafamilial social and economic relationships associated with different modes of production and to examine the effect on the value of children of changes in these relationships.
NOTES

1 World Fertility Survey, Basic Documentation, no.1, Core Questionnaires (London, March 1975). The only socioeconomic questions are on education, literacy, residence at 12 years of age (countryside, town, city) and work histories of respondent and husband. The exception to the generalization is the fairly detailed work history for the two spouses.


The Passing of the Traditional Society was first published in 1958. The first Middle Eastern study to identify groups with lower fertility was David Yaukey, Fertility Differences in a Modernizing Country: A Survey of Lebanese Couples (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). Lerner's questionnaire seeks information at the end under the heading of "Respondent's Personal Characteristics", on the number of children, and ages of eldest and youngest child, but the material is not employed in the analysis.

Hagen, cited in note 6.

Smith and Inkeles, cited in note 6, p.355.

Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), India, Israel and Nigeria.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.27.

Ibid., p.32.

Ibid., p.84.

Ibid., p.143.

Lewis, cited in note 3, p.311.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.312.


Ibid., p.19.


Myrdal (1968), cited in note 7, p.1443.

Ibid., p.1445.

Ibid., p.1447.

Ibid.

Schultz, cited in note 7, p.53.

Ibid., pp.55-56.

Ibid., pp.59-61.


An attempt at a theoretical approach to these problems is Yoram Ben-Porath, "Family functions and structure and the organization of exchange", in Conference on "Economic and Demographic Change: Issues for the 1980's" Helsinki 1978, Solicited Papers (Liege: IUSSP, 1978), pp.4.1.3-1 to 4.1.3-14.

Including the works cited in note 8.


Deutsch, cited in note 9.

Black (1966), cited in note 8, p.23.

Moore, cited in note 8, p.77.


Clark, cited in note 7, p.187.

Ibid., pp.186-187.


Davis, cited in note 3.

There has been protest at studying "modernization" without an adequate study of society at the beginning of the specified period and from a "neo-evolutionist" point of view. Cf. Bendix (1967), cited in note 8; Anthony D. Smith, The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist Theory of Social Change (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); Feldman and Hurn, cited in note 8. However, the writers do not mention demographic change.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, pp.4-5.

Foster, cited in note 8, p.2.

Ibid., p.1.

Hagen, cited in note 6, p.65.

Lerner, cited in note 6, p.53.


Ibid., p.401.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.16.

Ibid., p.290.

Ibid., p.18.

Ibid., p.5.

Ibid., p.303.


Mannheim, cited in note 8, p.15.


Hagen, cited in note 6, p.97.

Kellert et al., cited in note 8, pp.407-408.


Kahl, cited in note 8, pp.6-8.

Ibid., p.79.


Ibid., pp.6-7.

Ibid., p.6.


John C. Caldwell, "Mass education as the major determinant of the timing of the onset of sustained fertility decline" (in press).

Hagen, cited in note 6, p.63.

Ibid., p.65.

Foster, cited in note 8, p.59.

Ibid., p.5.

Hagen, cited in note 6, p.161.

Ibid., p.145.

Ibid., p.146.

Ibid., pp.71-72.

Ibid., p.6.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.4.

Hagen, cited in note 6, pp.55-62.

Lerner, cited in note 6, p.3.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.78.

Hagen, cited in note 6, p.185.

Crook, cited in note 8.

Ibid., p.206.

Lerner, cited in note 6, pp.19-42.

Ibid., p.44.


Schnaiberg, cited in note 8, p.419.

Bendix (1967), cited in note 8, p.293.

Ibid., p.317.

Feldman and Hurn, cited in note 8, p.379.
100 Ibid., p.379, f.n.5.
101 These are minimum sample sizes because it is assumed that all respondents belong to one or the other of the two categories and that the sizes of the two categories are similar.
104 Ibid., p.268.
105 Ibid.
106 Feldman and Hurn, cited in note 8, p.381.
113 Lerner, cited in note 6, p.viii.
114 Ibid., p.ix.
115 Ibid., pp.viii-ix.
116 Ibid., p.45
117 Inkeles (1977), cited in note 6, p.145.
118 Ibid., p.146.
119 Ibid.
Black, cited in note 8, p.4.

Ibid., p.6.

Ibid., pp.7-8.

Feldman and Hurn, cited in note 8, p.378.

Davis, cited in note 8, p.67.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.139ff.

Ibid., p.18.


Bellah, cited in note 8, p.37.


John C. Caldwell et al., "The demography of micro-states" (in press).

Ames, cited in note 130, p.143.

Ibid., p.152.

Ibid., p.168.

Ibid., p.160.


Hagen, cited in note 6, p.25.


Calculated from Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1978 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1978), Table 2A, based on data for 26 countries, not including India, China or most African states.


Eisenstadt, cited in note 8, p.3.

Davis, cited in note 8, p.68.

Feldman and Hurn, cited in note 8, p.381.


Crook, cited in note 8.

Lerner, cited in note 6, pp.19-42.

Foster, cited in note 8, p.60.

Moore and Feldman, cited in note 8, pp.300-301.


Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, pp.319-347.


Caldwell (1978), cited in note 73, pp.568-569.


Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.19.

Inkeles, cited in note 6, p.144.

Inkeles and Smith, cited in note 6, p.333.

Ibid., p.282.

Ibid., p.214.

Ibid., p.282.

Ibid., p.283.

Ibid., p.285.

Ibid., p.236ff.

Ibid., p.304.

Ibid., p.303.
Ibid., p.214.
Lerner, cited in note 6, pp.398-399.
Ibid., p.117.
Caldwell (1976), cited in note 73.